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Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attackers and/or defenders access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDERs mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide unique insight into the value of secrecy and deception to either side. We demonstrate with two hypothetical North Korean scenarios.
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
gbrown{at}nps.edu
mcarlyle{at}nps.edu
ddiehl{at}nps.edu
jekline{at}nps.edu
kwood{at}nps.edu
Subject classifications: missile defense; optimization; bilevel integer linear program; mixed-integer linear program.
History: Received June 2004;
revision received September 2004;
accepted March 2005.
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